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Abstract
We study hedonic games with heterogeneous player types that re
ect her nationality,
ethnic background, or skill type. Agents' preferences are dictated by status-seeking where
status can be either local or global. The two dimensions of status dene the two compo-
nents of a generalized constant elasticity of substitution utility function. In this setting,
we characterize the core as a function of the utility's parameter values and show that
in all cases the corresponding cores are non-empty. We further discuss the core stable
outcomes in terms of their segregating versus integrating properties.
Keywords: coalitions, core, stability, status-seeking
JEL Classication Numbers: C78, J41, D71
1 Introduction
When following fashion or joining a political party, choosing a home or nding a job, indi-
viduals' choices dene group membership. In such situations, individuals are often motivated
by status seeking. On the one hand, all members of a given group enjoy the same social
status relative to other groups. On the other hand, the status of members of the same group
may dier in social status relative to each other when individual heterogeneity is taken into
account. Thus, social status has a `global' (inter-group) and a `local' (intra-group) dimension.
In this work we study the interplay between global and local status in group formation
by quality-indexed players of two distinct types. We take a player's type to capture innate
characteristics such as nationality, ethnic background, or skill-type. Thus groups may be
The authors are thankful to participants of the 15th Coalition Theory Network Workshop, Marseille, 2010.
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1homogeneous (i.e., contain one type of players) or heterogeneous (i.e., contain both types of
players) in nature. Depending on players' preferences for global and local status as represented
by a constant elasticity of substitution utility function, we obtain dierent sets of core-stable
outcomes. We further discuss these outcomes in terms of their segregating versus integrating
properties. Segregated outcomes refer to partitions of the player set in which high-quality and
low-quality players of each type are members of dierent groups. Instead, integrated outcomes
refer to partitions in which the type-specic average quality of players in each group is the
same.
Our work contributes to the theoretical literature in economics on socially referenced
preferences inspired by Schelling (1978), on social status started by Frank (1985), and in
particular is akin to models founded on constrained interdependence (cf. Cole et al. 1992).1
The novelty of this work is in its focus on the way global and local status jointly shape group
formation, and in its methodology rooted in the hedonic games tradition which allows for an
arbitrary number of groups to be formed, and for groups of arbitrary size.
More closely, our study is related to Milchtiach and Winter (2002) and Watts (2007)
who also discuss segregation within a status-based preferences setting. We build upon the
work of Watts (2007) in dening our notions of local and global status and the properties of
segregation and integration. As in Watts (2007), our agents prefer to have a higher local status
measured by their relative position in the group. While we measure the relative position as
the distance from the average, she captures it by the rank of the individual in the group.2
Moreover, while global status in her work is measured by the average quality of agents in the
group, here, global status is given by the average quality of group members of the other type.
Therefore, an agent's quality aects the group global status directly in Watts's sense, but it
aects it only in strategic terms here. Milchtiach and Winter (2002), on the other hand, dene
agents' preferences to be decreasing in the distance from the average quality. While there are
many situations where such preferences are a good proxy for reality{e.g., voting on the level
1For a very recent extensive survey of theoretical works on social status as well as studies that provide
empirical evidence for the signicance of status seeking in economics, see Truyts (2010).
2Notice that `relative position' is a more general notion than `rank' as the dierence in ranks of two con-
secutively ordered agents is the same for all distinct pairs of consecutively ordered agents, while the dierence
in relative positions may dier.
2of public good{there are other situations in which having a higher than the average index is
desirable, e.g., when reward is based on relative performance. A more important distinction
between our work and the works of the authors mentioned above is that they study group
formation with a restriction on the number of groups that may be formed when players are
of a homogeneous type. As a consequence, the notion of stability used here, the core, is not
applicable in their works. Finally, as we investigate various types of preference proles in
which local and global status jointly determine agents' choices, we nd conditions for which
integrated outcomes may be stable. In contrast, segregated outcomes are the unique type of
stable outcomes in these authors' works.
This paper also has a place within the vast literature on group formation when agents'
preferences over group membership depend on the identity of the other members of the group.
Group formation by heterogeneous types of agents has been analyzed in a large literature on
two-sided matching problems originated by Shapley and Shubik (1972). The hedonic coalition
formation literature (cf. Dr eze and Greenberg, 1980) studies group formation when agents
are homogeneous and their preferences depend on group membership only. Our work may be
viewed as marrying these two strands of the literature.3 Another strand of the literature that
combines matching and coalition formation is that on eective coalitions (cf. Kaneko and
Wooders, 1982). Like that literature, we use the notion of core to study stability, however,
we do not impose any restrictions on the type of coalitions that may form.
Within the matching literature, our work is closely related to the class of papers on many-
to-one matchings with peer eects (see Dutta, and Mass o, 1997; and more recently Echenique
and Yenmez, 2007; Pycia, 2007; and Revilla, 2007). The dierence between our work and
theirs is that in our framework group formation occurs on both sides of the market while
in theirs it happens on one side of the market only. Our paper is also related to the work
of Kaneko and Kimura (1992) who study group formation by heterogeneous types agents,
black and white, whose preferences over groups depend on the size of the group. Similarly,
Karni and Schmeidler (1990) study the splitting of the population which contains two types
of agents into three groups when preferences depend on the relative size of each group. In
3In a dierent paper, Dimitrov and Lazarova (2008), we study the necessary and sucient conditions that
guarantee non-emptiness of the core when the preference proles are lexicographic.
3contrast, in our work peer eects are not size-based.
In this paper, we use the notion of the core to study stability where identity is conceptu-
alized as a hedonic trait, thus our work is also related to the literature on hedonic coalition
formation. Banerjee et al. (2001), Bogomolnaia and Jackson (2002), and Ihl e (2007), among
others, introduce various notions of stability and provide sucient conditions for the existence
of stable partitions in hedonic games. In this literature, however, identity is summarized in
the index of each agent and authors do not discuss heterogeneous types of agents. Moreover,
the preference proles studied here dier from those usually analyzed in the literature such
as separable, size-based, and symmetric preferences.
Finally, this paper is related to the literature on local public goods (cf. Tiebout, 1956;
and, more recently, Conley and Wooders, 2001) as we, too, study group membership by
heterogeneous types of agents. We, however, do not discuss public group production and the
size of the partition in our model is not restricted as in the case of jurisdictions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the basic con-
cepts used in our analysis. In Section 3 we characterize the set of core stable outcomes for
dierent parameter values of the constant elasticity of substitution utility function. In par-
ticular, when individuals seek only local status or when local and global status are considered
to be (imperfect) substitutes, we show the generic uniqueness of the core: in all core-stable
outcomes agents have zero utility. When individuals seek only global status, instead, the core
stable outcomes vary in terms of players' utility levels. In this case, we provide an algorithm
that characterizes the core-stable outcomes. We further provide a characterization of the core
when global and local status are treated as substitutes and show the non-emptiness of the
core by means of another algorithm. Finally, we conclude in Section 4 with some insights
that our analysis contributes to the existing literature.
2 Notation and Denitions
Let Na = f1a;2a;:::;mag and Nb =

1b;2b;:::;nb	
with m  n be two disjoint and nite
sets of agents of type a and type b, respectively. For each player i 2 N := Na [Nb we denote
4by Ni = fX  N j i 2 Xg the collection of all coalitions containing i. A partition  of N is
called a coalition structure. For each coalition structure  and each player i 2 N, we denote
by (i) the coalition in  containing player i, i.e., (i) 2  and i 2 (i). Further, we assume
that each player i 2 N is endowed with a preference i over Ni, i.e., a binary relation over Ni
which is re
exive, complete, and transitive. Denote by i and i the strict and indierence
relation associated with i and by := (1;2;:::;n) a prole of preferences i for all
i 2 N. A player's preference relation over coalitions canonically induces a preference relation
over coalition structures in the following way: For any two coalition structures  and 0,
player i weakly prefers  to 0 if and only if he weakly prefers \his" coalition in  to the
one in 0, i.e.,  0
i  if and only if (i) 0
i (i). Hence, we assume that players' preferences
over coalition structures are purely hedonic. That means they are completely characterized
by their preferences over coalitions. Finally, a hedonic game (N;) is a pair consisting of the
set of players and a preference prole. Given a hedonic game (N;), a coalition structure 
of N is core stable if there does not exist a nonempty coalition X such that X i (i) holds
for each i 2 X.
3 Preferences and the Core
Each each agent ic 2 Na [ Nb, c 2 fa;bg, is endowed with quality level qc
i.4 Without
loss of generality, we index the agents in such a way that qa
1 > qa
2 > ::: > qa
m > 0 and
qb
1 > qb
2 > ::: > qb
n > 0; thus, 1c is the member of Nc with the highest quality, 2c is the
member of Nc with the second highest quality, and so on.
We assume that players' choice of group membership is driven by status-seeking. We
distinguish between two types of status: local status which is dened by a player's relative
position among the members of the group of his own type; and global status as dened by
the average quality of the group members of the opposite type. For all coalitions S  N and





be the type-specic average quality of group S. We
follow the convention qc(S) = 0 for S \ Nc = ;.
Consider an agent ic 2 Nc, c 2 fa;bg, and a group S 2 Nic. As a member of group S
4One might think of the quality index as a re
ection of the individual's talent or material endowment.













where c0 2 fa;bg with c0 6= c. The rst component of the utility function, qc
i  qc(S), re
ects a
player's local status and the second component, qc0
(S), summarizes her global status. Notice
that while global status is always a positive number, local status may be negative. This will
be the case for all players in a group whose quality is below that of the average quality of the
players of the same type who are members of this group. The two positive parameters  and
 capture the relative weight attributed to local and global status, respectively. Given this
CES utility function, we further need to assume that  is an odd positive integer, otherwise
for some  values5, there may be a coalition in which a player, whose quality is below the
average quality of the players of the same type, attains a higher local status than a player
of the same type with quality above this average. The elasticity of substitution between the
two types of status is constant and is given by .
Finally, we dene the properties of segregation and integration on which our analysis of
the core stable outcomes will focus. Following Watts (2007, Def. 3), a coalition structure 








, we have kc 2 (ic); and (ii) given any four agents ic;jc;kc;`c 2 Nc with
c = fa;bg where qc
i;qc
j  q0 and qc
k;qc
`  q00 with q00 < q0, it cannot be that kc 2 (ic), `c 2 (jc)
and jc 62 (ic). A coalition structure  is fully integrated if for any two agents ic;jc 2 Nc
with c 2 fa;bg, we have that q((ic)\Na) = q((jc)\Na) and q((ic)\Nb) = q((jc)\Nb).
Next, we characterize the core as a function of the parameter values. We rst consider the
two extreme cases: where only local status matters; and where only global status matters.
3.1 Local Status
If agents look only at the groups of their own type and are guided by the distance between
their own quality and the average quality of the group, their preferences over compositions
of a- and b-groups may be represented by (1) with  set equal to 0. That is for all ic 2 Nc,
5In particular, we will discuss the case  ! 1.
6c 2 fa;bg, and any group S 2 Nic, agent ic derives utility
uic(S) =   (qc
i   qc(S)):
Our rst result is straightforward.6 Consider the set of coalition structures in which there is
at most one player of each type in a coalition structure element, i.e.,
 = f : j (ic) \ Ncj  1 for each c 2 fa;bg and ic 2 Ncg: (2)
It is easy to show that  fully describes the core is this case. In other words, in a core stable
coalition structure there are no coalitions containing at least two distinct players of the same
type - if this were the case, then among those players of the same type, the one with the
lowest quality would prefer to stay alone, and hence, can block the corresponding coalition
structure.7 Clearly, the set of core stable outcomes when only local status matters are all
segregated in nature.
3.2 Global Status
Consider next the other extreme case in which there are no own-type peer eects and each
player seeks a group membership where the players of the opposite type have higher average
quality.8 Players' preferences are thus represented by (1) with  = 0 that takes the form
uic(S) =   qc0
(S): (3)
6Notice that for this result we do not need the restriction that  is an odd integer.
7It is straightforward to see that the core of a corresponding hedonic game which has either a- or b-type
agents contains only the partition into singletons.
8Note that this type of problem has not been previously studied in the matching literature. Unlike in the
many-to-one matching models, here coalition formation happens on both sides of the market. Furthermore, it
diers from the standard many-to-many model because the outcome is a partition of the player set.
7The core in this case is again non-empty as for instance the following three coalition structures
are core stable.
0 : ff1ag [ Nb;Na n f1agg;
00 :







f1ag [ f1bg;f2ag [ f2bg;:::;fmag [ fmbg;Nb n f1b;:::;mbg
	
:
Clearly, coalition structure 0 is the one most preferred by the b-type agents as they are in the
same coalition with the a-group with the highest average quality. Similarly, 00 is the most
preferred core stable coalition structure by the a-type agents. One can think of 000, instead,
as a \fair" coalition structure as the best set of a-agents is grouped together with the best
set of b-agents.9 While 000 is a segregated outcome which is in the core of any hedonic game
with this type of preferences, outcomes 0 and 00 have a hybrid nature: they are segregated
with respect to one type of players and integrated with respect to the other.
Keeping these three examples in mind, let us now fully describe the set of core stable
coalition structures for this extreme case. We precede the main result by providing an algo-
rithm which delivers a partition  of the set of agents Na [ Nb into compositions of a- and
b-groups.
Algorithm 1
 Set N1 := Na, N2 := Nb, and  := ;.
 Repeat the following until N1 [ N2 = ;:




ia 2 N1 : qa
i  qa





B0  N2 : q(B0)  max

qb





A0  N1 : q(A0)  max

qa
i : ia 2 N1 n A0		
and
9In the literature on social status based on constraint interdependence, the coalition structure 
000 is called
`positively assortative' (cf. Truyts 2010, p. 144).
8B =
n
ib 2 N2 : qb
i  qb
j for all jb 2 N2
o
.
- Set N1 := N1 n A, N2 := N2 n B and  :=  [ fA [ Bg.
 Return .
We denote by e  the set of all partitions delivered by the above algorithm.
Proposition 1 Let (N;) be a hedonic game with status-based preferences represented by
the CES utility function given in (1) with  = 0. Then a coalition structure  is core stable
if and only if  2 e .
Proof. Let  = fA1 [ B1;A2 [ B2;:::;AP [ BPg 2 e . We show that  is core stable.
Notice rst that by construction the average quality of the groups Ap and Bp, p = 1;:::;P,
is non-negative. Suppose now that X  N is blocking . Then it has to be the case that
X \ Na 6= ; and X \ Nb 6= ;. Let p = minfp : (Ap [ Bp) \ X 6= ;g.
Case 1 (Ap \X 6= ; and Bp \X = ;): Take ia 2 Ap \X and let i
b 2 X \Nb be the agent
with the highest quality level in X \ Nb. Since X is blocking  we have
qb
i  q(X \ Nb) > q( (ia) \ Nb) = q(Bp): (4)






and that, by construction, we have either
q(Bp) = qb
~ i (5)






























and combining (4) with either (5) or (6),
we have a contradiction.
Case 2 (Ap \ X = ; and Bp \ X 6= ;)): The proof is analogous to the one in Case 1.
Case 3 (Ap \ X 6= ; and Bp \ X 6= ;): The proof is again analogous to the one in Case 1







9We conclude that  is core stable.




is a core stable coalition structure but  = 2 e .
Let Ar := Cr \ Na and Br := Cr \ Na for all Cr 2 . W.l.o.g., let the coalition structure
elements of  be ordered in such a way that  =

A1 [ B1;A2 [ B2;:::;AR [ BR
	
with
q(Br)  q(Br+1) for r = 1;:::;R   1 with the average quality of the empty set being equal
to zero.
Notice rst that if there is a coalition structure element Cr 2  s.t. jArj  2 and jBrj  2,
then  will be not core stable as the higher quality a- and b-agents in Cr would block it by












  1 and
 Br
  2 f0;1g.
Next, take A1 [ B1 and consider the following possible cases.
Case 1 (A1 = ;): The coalition

1a;1b	
is blocking . Since q(B1)  q(Br) holds for
all r = 2;:::;R, it implies 1b 2 B1. In addition, A1 = ; implies that u1a((1a)) < qb
1 and
u1b((1b)) = 0 < qa
1. Thus, we have a contradiction to the core stability of .
Case 2 (
 A1
  = 1): If A1 6=
n
ia 2 Na : qa
i  qa
j for all ja 2 Na
o
= f1ag and A1 = 2
fA0  Na : q(A0)  maxfqa




can block . Hence, we conclude that A1 has to have the structure as
indicated in the above algorithm.
Furthermore, if A1 =
n
ia 2 Na : qa
i  qa
j for all ja 2 Na
o
= f1ag and B1 = 2












is blocking  since qb
1 > q(B1) and
qa
1 > q(Ar) hold for all r = 2;:::;R (note that 
 
1b
\ Na = Ar for some r 2 f2;:::;Rg).
Thus, we have again a contradiction to the core stability of .
The case in which
 B1
  = 1 can be treated similarly. In an analogous way one can show
that all elements of  have the structure provided by the above algorithm. We conclude that
the core stability of  implies  2 e .
As a corollary of Proposition 1, one can note that a fully integrated coalition structure is
never in the core of a hedonic game when preference are based on global status. The reason
for this is that there is at most a single representative of at least one of the players types in
every coalition structure element derived by Algorithm 1.
103.3 Local and Global Status
Here we discuss those cases in which both local and global status determine players' choice
of group membership.
The rst case we discuss is when local and global status are (imperfect) complements. In
this case we obtain a generic uniqueness of the core as in all core stable coalition structures,
players obtain zero utility.
Proposition 2 Let (N;) be a hedonic game with status-based preferences represented by the
CES utility function given in (1). If  ! 0 or  ! 1, then a coalition structure  is core
stable if and only if  2  as dened in (2).10
The proof of Proposition 2 is straightforward. It is easy to show that (1) takes the form
uic(S) = minf  (qc
i   qc(S));  qc0
(S)g (7)
when  ! 0; and the form
uic(S) = (qc
i   qc(S))  (qc0
(S)) (8)
when  ! 1.
Equations (7) and (8) imply that no two players of the same type will be members of
the same coalition in a core stable coalition structure. This is because the player with the
lower quality will obtain a negative utility and therefore will block this coalition structure by
staying alone (recall that in (8)  is an odd integer). Therefore, in all core stable coalition
structures each player obtains local status of 0. Finally, notice that irrespective of whether a
player is in a group with any other player of the opposite type or stays alone, her utility is 0
since qualities are strictly positive.
Next, we study the core stable coalition structures when players perceive the two types
of status as being substitutable. Our rst set of results discusses perfect substitutability
between the two types of status. For this we will need the following additional notation. For
10The restriction that  is an odd integer is important when  ! 1 but not when  ! 0.
11any A  Na and B  Nb let AB := qa(A) qb(B) (if either A or B is empty, we set the
corresponding average quality level to be equal to zero). Given a coalition structure , we write

AB for the weighted dierence in the average qualities of the groups A  Na and B  Nb with
A [ B 2 . Moreover, for any coalition structure , we let I
0 :=

i 2 Na [ Nb : j (i)j = 1
	
be the set of players that are single under .
Theorem 1 Let (N;) be a hedonic game with status-based preferences represented by the
CES utility function given in (1). If  =  and  ! 1, then an individually rational
coalition structure  is core stable if and only if the following two conditions are satised:
(1) I
0 \ Na = ; or I
0 \ Nb = ;.
(2) For any two non-empty a- and b-groups A0 and B0 with  (ia) \ Nb * B0 for all
ia 2 A0 the following two implications hold:
(2.1) A0B0 > maxB0\B6=; 
AB ) A0B0  minA0\A6=; 
AB.
(2.2) A0B0 < minA0\A6=; 
AB ) A0B0  maxB0\B6=; 
AB.
Proof. As  = , w.l.og., we can let  =  = 1. In addition,  ! 1 implies that (1) takes
the form
uic(S) = (qc
i   qc(S)) + qc0(S): (9)
Let  be a coalition structure satisfying items (1) and (2) of Theorem 1. We show that it
is core stable. Suppose not, i.e., there is X  N with X = A [ B that blocks . That is, we
have
qa
i   AB > qa
i   ((ia)\Na)((ia)\Nb)
for all ia 2 A, and
qb
i + AB > qb
i + ((ib)\Na)((ib)\Nb)
for all ib 2 B.
Suppose rst that A = ;. Notice then that the lowest quality agent in B can attain at
most zero utility in the blocking coalition. As  is individually rational, a coalition consisting
of b-type agents only cannot be blocking . For a similar reason, a coalition which consist of
only a-type agents cannot be blocking  either.
12Next, suppose that the blocking coalition consists of both a- and b-type agents, and that
there are ia 2 A and ib 2 B such that ib 2  (ia). Simple algebra shows that the above two
inequalities cannot hold simultaneously for these two agents.
Last, suppose that the blocking coalition consists of both a- and b-type agents such that
there are no two agents of two distinct types who are grouped together under . Such
blocking possibilities are ruled out by item (2) in the statement of the theorem. To see this,
notice that agent ia gets under  exactly qa
i   ((ia)\Na)((ia)\Nb). Similarly, any agent ib
gets qb
i + ((ib)\Na)((ib)\Nb) under . Hence, for the incentives of agents ia and ib to be
part of the blocking coalition X = A [ B, it must be that ((ib)\Na)((ib)\Nb) < AB <
((ia)\Na)((ia)\Nb). Therefore, item (2) guarantees that there is an a-agent (condition (2.1))
or a b-agent (condition (2.2)) for which such AB cannot be found.
As to show that items (1) and (2) are also necessary for a coalitional matching to be core
stable, let  be core stable and do not satisfy (1). This implies the existence of ia 2 Na and










 in contradiction to its core stability.
Suppose nally that  is core stable and does not satisfy (2). Consider rst the case in
which there are a- and b-groups A0 and B0 with  (ia) \ Nb * B0 for all ia 2 A0 such that
A0B0 > maxB0\B6=; 
AB and A0B0 < minA0\A6=; 
AB hold (i.e., (2.1) is violated). Consider
then the coalition A0 [ B0. To see that this coalition blocks , notice that all ib 2 B0
get in A0 [ B0 exactly qb
i + A0B0 > qb
i + ((ib)\Na)((ib)\Nb) (as A0B0 > maxB0\B6=; 
AB
holds). Furthermore, all ia 2 A0 get qa
i   A0B0 > qa
i   ((ib)\Na)((ib)\Nb) because of
A0B0 < minA0\A6=; 
AB. Similarly, one can show how A0 and B0 can be used to form a
blocking coalition if condition (2.2) is violated.
The signicance of Condition (2) in Theorem 1 is illustrated in the example below.
Example 1 Let Na = f1a;2a;3ag and Nb = f1b;2bg with qa
1 = 4, qb
1 = 3, qa
2 = qb
2 = 2, and
qa
3 = 1. Let agents' preferences be represented by the CES utility function given in (1) with
 ! 1 and  =  = 1.
Consider the coalition structure  with (1a) = (1b) = f1a;1bg, (2a) = (2b) = f2a;2bg,
13and (3a) = f3ag. This coalition structure is not stable as it is blocked by the coalition











u1a(f1a;1bg). Similarly, one can show that both agents 3a and 2b strictly prefer f1a;3a;2bg
over their corresponding coalitions under .
Special classes of core stable partitions can be derived as corollaries to Theorem 1.
Corollary 1 Let (N;) be a hedonic game with status-based preferences represented by the






and  be a partition of Na [ Nb s.t. AB =  for all A  Na and B  Nb with A [ B 2 .
Then  is core stable.
The proof is easy to see. The condition  qb
n    qa
m ensures that  is individually
rational, while the fact that the corresponding a- and b-groups have equal average quality
(= ) guarantees that conditions (1) and (2) of Theorem 1 hold.
Furthermore, Corollary 1 describes conditions under which a segregating coalition struc-
ture is in the core. It states that such segregated coalition structures are in the core if the
dierence between the average quality of the a- and b-groups in each coalition is the same
for all elements in the partition. This result implies that it is not only that higher ranked
agents of each type are grouped together under this condition, but also that a certain fairness
requirement is satised: the average quality of each a-group belonging to a coalition in the
partition exceeds/falls under the average quality of the b-group in this coalition by the same
amount.
To illustrate the signicance of Corollary 1 for the stability of segregating outcomes, we
refer again to Example 1 above. In this example, we study a segregated outcome in which the
highest ranked individuals from each type are grouped together, the second highest individuals
of each type are also grouped together, and the lowest ranked a-agent remains single. As the
analysis shows this segregated matching is not in the core, and indeed Corollary 1's condition,
the dierences between the average quality of a- and b-groups belonging to the same coalition
must be equal, is not satised for this partition: f1agf1bg = 1, and f2agf2bg = 0. The
following example shows a coalition formation problem in which the core contains a segregated
14outcome.
Example 2 Let Na = f1a;2a;3ag and Nb = f1b;2bg with qa
1 = 4, qb
1 = 3, qa
2 = 2, and
qb
2 = qa
3 = 1. Let agents' preferences be represented by the CES utility function given in (1)
with  ! 1 and  =  = 1.
Consider the coalition structure  with (1a) = (1b) = f1a;1bg, (2a) = (2b) = f2a;2bg,
and (3a) = f3ag. It is easy to see that  is core stable as there exists no blocking coalition.
Notice that f1agf1bg = f2agf2bg = f3ag; = 1.
The next corollary describes conditions under which a fully integrated coalition structure
is stable.
Corollary 2 Let (N;) be a hedonic game with status-based preferences represented by the
CES utility function given in (1). Let  =  and  ! 1. Furthermore, let qa
m   q(Na) +
q(Nb)  0, qb
n   q(Nb) + q(Na)  0, and K  m. Let  = fA1 [ B1;:::;AK [ BKg be a
partition of Na [ Nb s.t. q(Ak) = q(Ak+1) and q(Bk) = q(Bk+1) for all k = 1;:::;K   1.
Then  is core stable.
Notice here that the condition that all a- and b-groups in the partition  have the same
average quality implies that this average quality equals the (positive) average quality of Na
and Nb, respectively. Therefore, the conditions qa
m   q(Na) + q(Nb)  0 and qb
n   q(Nb) +
q(Na)  0 imply that this type of partition is individually rational. Furthermore, q(Ak) =
q(Ak+1) and q(Bk) = q(Bk+1) for all k = 1;:::;K   1 guarantees that condition (2) of
Theorem 1 is satised as well. In other words, condition (2) of Theorem 1 is satised for all
fully integrated coalition structures, and, therefore for such a partition to be in the core, only
the individually rationality condition may be a constraining factor.
As an example of a coalition formation problem for which a fully integrated outcome is in




and it is in the core.
Our next result shows that under perfect substitutability of the a- and b-groups when
 = , there always exists a core stable coalition structure.
Theorem 2 Let (N;) be a hedonic game with status-based preferences represented by the
15CES utility function given in (1) with  =  and  ! 1. Then a core stable coalition
structure exists.
Proof. Consider the following algorithm for delivering a coalition structure.
Algorithm 2
We initialize the algorithm by setting A0 = Na, B0 = Nb, A0 = ;, and B0 = ;. In the kth
step of the algorithm, we set Ak = Ak 1 n Ak 1, Bk = Bk 1 n Bk 1, Ak = Ak 1 [ fia 2 Ak :
qa
i  q(Ak)+q(Bk) < 0g, and Bk = Bk 1[fib 2 Bk : qb
i  q(Bk)+q(Ak) < 0g. The algorithm
stops when A` = A` 1 and B` = B` 1 and we set K = `. Dene the coalition structure 
by (ic) = AK [ BK for all ic 2 AK [ BK, (ia) = fiag for all ia 2 AK = Na n AK, and
(ib) = fibg for all ib 2 BK = Nb n BK.
We show that  is core stable. First, we will show that K is nite, and, in particular that
it is an integer at most equal to n + 1. Notice that either A1 = ; or B1 = ;; otherwise there
is an agent with negative quality, which is not possible. For ease of exposition, suppose that
A1 = ;. Since qb
i   q(B1) + q(A1) < 0 for some ib 2 Nb, it is clear that qb
i < q(B1) and,
therefore, q(B2)  q(B1). This is why for all a-agents qa
i   q(A2) + q(B2)  0. Similarly,
one can show that AK = Na and AK = ;. The above analysis and the fact that Nb is nite
proves that K is nite. Moreover, as q(Na) > 0 and q(Nb) > 0, implies that AK 6= ; and
BK 6= ;, and, therefore K  n + 1.
Next, we will show that there is no coalition X that blocks the constructed partition
. Suppose, on the contrary, that such a coalition exists. First, suppose that X consists of
homogeneous type agents, i.e., X  Na or X  Nb. Notice that by construction all agents in
AK and BK have at least zero utility under . Furthermore, all agents in AK and BK have
also zero utility under . Since the agents with the lowest quality in X can obtain at most
zero utility in X, the coalition X cannot be blocking .
Suppose next that there are at least two agents ia;ib 2 X who belong to the same coalition
in . For X to be blocking  it must be that
qa
i   q(X \ Na) + q(X \ Nb) > qa
i   q(AK) + q(BK)
16and
qb
i   q(X \ Nb) + q(X \ Na) > qb
i   q(BK) + q(AK):
Simple algebra shows that the above two inequalities cannot hold simultaneously.
Last suppose that there are at least two agents ia;ib 2 X who belong to dierent coalitions
in . W.l.o.g., suppose that ia 2 AK and ib 2 BK. It is easy to see that the agent with the
highest quality level in AK, is one who is in AK (and therefore in AK 1) but not in AK 2.
Denote this agent by i
a. Then, by construction, we have
qia  qa
i < q(AK 2)   q(BK 2) < q(AK)   q(BK): (10)
Furthermore, notice that by denition of i
a, q( e A)  qa
i for all e A  AK. Therefore, for X to
be blocking  it must be that for the b-agent in X with the lowest quality, denoted by ib, it
must hold that
qb
i   q(BK) + q(AK) < qb
i   q(X \ Nb) + q(X \ Na)  qb
i + qa
i ; (11)
where the last inequality follows from X \ Na  AK (note that X \ AK 6= ; would mean
that there are a b-agent (ib) and an a-agent who belong to the same coalition in  implying,
as shown above, that X is not blocking ). Clearly, expressions (10) and (11) lead to a
contradiction.
Last, we address the question under what distribution of qualities and values of the pa-
rameters of the CES utility function, we can obtain the segregated outcome which has been
found in the literature as the unique core stable coalition structure.11 For this result we
need an additional notation and a supplementary result. Let us denote the minimal dier-


















present a technical result.
11Milchtaich and Winter (2002) and Watts (2007) nd these types of outcome to be the only stable outcomes
in their framework. In a related literature, Eeckhout (2000), Shimer and Smith (2000), and Atakan (2006)
study positively assortative outcomes.
17Lemma 1 Let X  Nc, c 2 fa;bg, be such that jXj  2 and let i be the lowest quality
member of X. Then





Proof. Let X and i be as above. Then,



















where inequality (13) follows from the denition of qc
min and inequality (14) follows from
jXj  2.
Now we are ready to present our nal result.
Proposition 3 Let (N;) be a hedonic game with status-based preferences represented by the








1 < 0, then
 = ff1a;1bg;f2a;2bg;:::;fma;mbg;f(m + 1)bg;:::;fnbgg is the unique core stable coalition
structure.
Proof. Notice that  ! 1 implies that (1) takes the form
uic(S) =   (qc
i   qc(S)) +   qc0(S): (15)
First we consider coalition structure  as dened above and show that it is core stable.
As there is at most one representative of each type in a coalition structure element, each
player derives 0 utility from local status. As individual qualities are strictly positive, it is
clear from (15), that all players derive a non-negative utility in the coalition structure, and,
therefore it is individually rational. Next, suppose that there is a blocking coalition X such
that jX \Ncj  2 for some c 2 fa;bg. Let ic 2 X be the player with lowest quality in X \Nc.
18For some c0 2 fa;bg with c0 6= c, the utility player ic can derive in X is given by
uic(X) =   (qc












+   qc0
1 (17)
< 0 (18)
where inequality (16) follows from Lemma 1, inequality (17) follows by denition, and in-
equality (18) follows by assumption. Therefore, X cannot block . Last, suppose that there
is a blocking coalition X s.t. jX \ Ncj = 1 for each c 2 fa;bg. W.l.o.g, suppose X\Nb = fib
kg
for some k 2 f1;:::;ng. This player's utility in  must equal  qa
ik if k  m and 0 otherwise.
Hence, for player ib
k to attain higher utility in X, X \ Na = fia
` : ` 2 1;:::;minfm;k   1gg.
Player ia
` utility in , however, is  qb
i` which is higher than  qb
ik that is the utility she can
achieve in X. This establishes a contradiction.
Last, we show that there is no other coalition structure which is core stable. From the
analysis above (i.e., inequalities (16-18)), it is clear that the only individually rational coalition
structures are those for which there is at most one player of each type in a coalition structure
element. Suppose, that there is an individually rational coalition structure 0 which is core
stable and suppose that f1a;1bg 62 0. Then 0 can be blocked by coalition X = f1a;1bg as
u1a (0(1a)) =  qb
j <  qb





i <  qa
1
for all ia 2 Nanf1ag. Similarly by iteration, we can show that if 0 is core stable, then it must
contain the coalitions fia;ibg for all i 2 1;:::;m. Finally notice that the only individually
rational partition of the player set Nb nf1b;:::;mbg is that into singletons. This implies that
0 and  must coincide.
4 Conclusion
We study group formation when agents' preferences are dictated by the identity of the other
agents in the group and in particular by the local and global status they may achieve by being
19members of a group. Our theoretical results show that in all four cases: when agents only
care about their local status; when the agents only care about their global status; when local
and global status are treated as substitutes; and when the two types of status are treated as
complements; there exists a core stable outcome.
Furthermore, we can identify the types of outcomes which are stable in light of segregation
and integration. As Truyts (2010, p. 158) points out segregated outcomes have received the
most attention in the literature as they are often the more ecient, integrated outcomes,
however, may sometimes be more realistic or preferred from the welfare point of view. We
dene as segregated those outcomes in which the higher quality agents of each type are
grouped together and there are at least two groups of agents containing each type. When
only local status matters and when local and global status are (imperfect) complements all
core-stable outcomes are of the segregated type. When only global status matters there is
a segregated outcome in the core of every hedonic game. In contrast, when local and global
status are substitutes Corollary 1 shows that such segregated outcomes may be stable if and
only if the dierence in average quality between the groups of a- and b-agents is the same for
all elements in the partition. Whether or not this condition is satised hinges crucially on
the distribution of qualities of agents of each type. Corollary 2, instead, may be viewed as
describing coalition structures characterized by full integration since all groups in the partition
have the same average quality of their a-members and the same average quality of their b-
members. This coalition structure can also be interpreted in the light of `social equality'
between groups as one which is envy-free. Notice that the coalition structure derived by
the algorithm in the proof of Theorem 2 can be one of the type of partitions described in
Corollary 2 in case the grand coalition is individually rational for all agents. When this is not
the case, this algorithm derives a stable outcome of what we may call a `hybrid' construct.
In this coalition structure all agents of one type are grouped together with a strict subset of
the agents of the other type, hence, these agents are in an integrated state. The other type
of agents, instead, are in a segregated state because there is a quality threshold such that all
agents of this type whose quality is higher are grouped together with all the agents of the
opposite type and all those whose quality is lower stay single.
20Finally, our results may be seen as providing an alternative mechanism to the one discussed
by Frank (1985) for gluing individuals together in social groups when they care for local
status. Frank argues that what keeps a low-ranked individual in a group with higher ranked
individuals are transaction costs (see Frank, 1985, p. 10). These transaction costs outweigh
the gains such an individual might reap from moving to another group where her local status
will be higher. In our setting transaction costs are zero. What keeps low-ranked individuals
in a group with higher ranked individuals is the access to a group with another type of agents
that this membership provides.
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